“Our Neighbors In The Americas”: Obama, Empathy, and the Cuban Thaw by McKinnis, Sarah
The Yale Undergraduate Research Journal 
Volume 2 
Issue 1 Spring 2021 Article 20 
2021 




Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj 
 Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public 
Administration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
McKinnis, Sarah (2021) "“Our Neighbors In The Americas”: Obama, Empathy, and the Cuban Thaw," The 
Yale Undergraduate Research Journal: Vol. 2 : Iss. 1 , Article 20. 
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/20 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at 
Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Yale Undergraduate Research Journal by an authorized editor of 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact 
elischolar@yale.edu. 
ABSTRACT
In the study of International Relations, there is growing research and consideration of the significance of empathy 
in political communications and nation-to-nation relationships. This article examines cognitive empathy, the abil-
ity to understand the perspectives and feelings of another, in the case of the Cuban Thaw, the reestablishment of 
diplomatic relations between Cuba and The United States. It traces President Obama’s use of empathy in publicly 
communicating intentions towards Cubans and Americans, a rhetoric that marks a contrast from the previous U.S. 
administrations’ attitudes toward Cuba. This article then analyzes the efficacy of that rhetoric, finding that though 
there are indications of positive effects, it is difficult to understand the long-term impact of his actions at this time. 
This case provides context as to the positive transformative power of empathy in IR, and the efficacy of empa-
thetic rhetoric in shifting public attitudes and encouraging cooperation between previously antagonistic nations. 
Empathy as a tool faces a number of practical limitations, all of which deserve greater research and attention.
“Our Neighbors In The Americas”: Obama, Empathy, 
and the Cuban Thaw
By Sarah E. McKinnis1
1Yale University
INTRODUCTION
In March of 2016, Barack Obama traveled to Cuba with a delega-
tion of family, staff, and Democrat and Republican congressional 
representatives, marking the first time in eighty-eight years that a 
sitting United States president visited the country. This was part 
of a much larger effort to normalize diplomatic relations between 
the United States and Cuba, which had been officially severed in 
1961. Since then, U.S. policy towards Cuba had been marked by 
isolation and hostility, including repeated attempts to overthrow 
Cuba’s Communist government. Obama’s approach came as a dras-
tic change in U.S. rhetoric and policy, and it included a nuanced 
understanding of the position of Cuba, its people, and its leaders. 
This paper examines the role of this nuanced understanding, better 
understood as empathy, in facilitating the administration’s new ap-
proach by focusing on one central question—where and how did 
Obama employ empathy in the Cuban Thaw and what was the im-
pact of this shift in rhetoric? 
Empathy and other emotions have traditionally been dismissed in 
IR as irrational and something to be mitigated, but they have long 
been part of practicing politics and diplomacy (Head, 2012, p. 37). 
More recent research reveals the significance of empathy in these 
domains and evidence that reason and emotion are significantly in-
tertwined (Yorke, 2017, p. 14). Obama, in particular, made empathy 
a large part of his politics, from the time he was a senator (Shogan, 
2009, p. 872). It also was a fundamental part of his personal ethics 
and character.1 
This paper will analyze Obama’s speeches and policy documents 
between 2014-2016, during which U.S.-Cuba relations were nor-
malized, a period of time known as the Cuban Thaw, arguing that 
1 See (Obama, 2006) for background.
his empathetic approach was successful in facilitating diplomatic 
change and in shifting public opinion in both the U.S. and Cuba. 
However, it was unable to generate significant democratic reforms 
in Cuba. This analysis adds to accruing research on empathy in 
International Relations and helps increase understanding of the im-
portance of empathy as a negotiating tool and as something to be 
employed more often, due to its efficacy in encouraging coopera-
tion between previously antagonistic nations.
EMPATHY IN IR
In line with IR scholarship on emotions, empathy will be theorized 
here as the “cognitive projection of oneself into the shoes of an-
other, whilst maintaining a clear differentiation between self and 
other,” (Head, 2012, p. 39) or, “to put oneself into the other’s place” 
(Wheeeler, 2008, p. 495). This definition of empathy has often been 
referred to as “cognitive empathy,” as opposed to “affective empa-
thy,” which involves feeling the same emotions as the person with 
whom you are empathizing (Head, 2012, p. 39).2  
Cognitive empathy has been shown to be an important part of pres-
idential leadership, particularly in allowing individuals to make 
more informed decisions and “formulate effective rhetorical argu-
ments” (Shogan, 2009, p. 874). This speaks to the importance of 
empathy in strategic communications, which is further illuminated 
by Yorke, who explains that communication employing empathy 
involves perceptive listening and understanding of the point of 
view of one’s counterpart (Head, 2012, p. 43). In the case of foreign 
policy, empathy can be used strategically to “develop cooperation 
with other countries and cultures through both public statements 
and private meetings” (Yorke, 2017, p. 150). 
2 See also (Yorke, 2017, p. 142) & (Head, 2016, p. 103).
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Another strategic use of empathy is in security dilemma sensibility, 
defined as:
[T]he ability to understand the role that fear might play in 
their attitudes and behaviour, including, crucially, the role 
that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear
(Booth & Wheeler, 2007, as cited in Wheeler, 2008, p. 496)
By understanding how an adversary views their state, a leader can 
better judge their motives and therefore diminish the fear inherent 
in the security dilemma, though not remove it entirely (Wheeler, 
2008, pp. 495-496).
Although empathy can successfully be used strategically, it will 
only be effective if it is perceived as genuine (Shogan, 2009, pp. 
862-874). Even within this definition, scholars and practitioners 
have identified limits and even dangers to empathy.3 In the follow-
ing analysis, the stated definition of empathy will be used to ana-
lyze where President Obama exhibited empathy, how different indi-
viduals and groups responded, and if it was successful in achieving 
the goals of the Obama administration.
METHODOLOGY
In order to determine where President Obama used empathy, this 
paper will focus on five central speeches by Obama in the period be-
tween December 2014, when the policy changes were announced, 
and March 2016, when Obama visited Cuba. This will include dis-
course analysis of the transcripts, along with analysis of the videos, 
which will allow for the rhetoric to be placed in the context of the 
event and audience, his body language, and tone. Yorke delineates 
the criteria used by scholars of empathy in discourse analysis, in-
cluding “evidence of perspective taking, and seeking to understand 
different sections of society and their political, historical, structural, 
and social-economic context;” “awareness of one’s own words and 
actions and how this might be perceived;” and “evidence of dis-
cussions of the importance of understanding another point of view 
and acknowledgement of recognition” (Yorke, 2017, p. 146). Also 
noted and included in these criteria will be words, phrases, com-
parisons, and analogies with connotations of empathy, particularly 
respect and trust towards a Cuban audience, and calls to stand in the 
shoes of the Cuban people that are directed toward a U.S. audience. 
This paper will rely on articles from The New York Times and The 
Wall Street Journal to show how Obama’s speeches were received. 
It will also include an analysis of some of Cuban President Raúl 
Castro’s remarks, which will serve to illuminate if and when Castro 
implemented empathy in his rhetoric.
However, even with these objectives, there are limitations to dis-
course analysis and the analysis of empathy more generally. As 
Mercer (1996) stated, “emotion is hard to define, hard to operation-
alize, hard to measure, and hard to isolate from others” (as cited 
in Clément & Sangar, 2017, p. 7). In focusing on externally dis-
played emotion, some of these challenges will be mitigated, but it 
will remain difficult to measure the role of the empathy displayed in 
subsequent tangible political changes. Discourse analysis “cannot 
3 See (Bloom, 2016) & (Johnson, 2010, p. 505) for more on the limits of empathy.
determine the intensity or relative weight of an emotion in relation 
to other emotions, nor does it indicate the involvement of counter-
vailing emotions” (Clément & Sangar, 2017, p. 24). Even emotion 
discourse analysis—in which emotions are more thoroughly inte-
grated into the method used—runs the risk of “homogenizing the 
emotions of groups” (Clément & Sangar, 2017, p. 24). In acknowl-
edging these biases and challenges, this research can be analyzed 
for what it adds to the scholarship on empathy in IR while under-
standing the limits on its conclusions. 
TRANSFORMING RELATIONS THROUGH EMPATHY
Obama’s belief in the importance of understanding others’ perspec-
tives made possible the negotiations that led to the normalization of 
U.S.-Cuba relations. An analysis of empathy in shifting the relation-
ship has to acknowledge the secret negotiations that happened prior 
to the December 17, 2014, announcement of policy changes. One 
factor was Obama’s belief—contrary to nearly the entire foreign pol-
icy establishment—that, as he said, “It. Is. Not. A. Reward. To. Talk. 
To. Folks.” (Rhodes, 2018, p. 15). This ran contrary to the rhetoric 
used by the previous administration, in which President Bush consis-
tently laid out preconditions for negotiating a change in the relation-
ship and maintained a policy of isolation and forced regime change 
(Bush, 2002). The contrast shows that empathy as employed by 
Obama was a distinct shift in the way the U.S. thought about Cuba.
Even before public announcement of the changes, Obama and his 
administration recognized the importance of acknowledging the his-
torical and political context of the relationship and Cuba’s point of 
view, which involved signaling from both countries demonstrating 
that they were serious about shifting the relationship (Yorke, 2017, 
p. 146). Ben Rhodes—one of the lead negotiators during the Cuban 
Thaw and Obama’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic 
Communications—described a series of small acts by Obama that 
indicated his understanding of the history and his desire to move be-
yond it, for example, when in 2013 he became the first U.S. presi-
dent to shake the hand of a Cuban president “since the revolution” 
(Rhodes, 2017, p. 261). The eventual success of these actions in 
bringing Cuba and the U.S. to an agreement suggests that empathetic 
rhetoric should be used more frequently in initial negotiations.   
The first public announcement of the policy changes came on De-
cember 17, 2014. Obama framed the shift in relations as explicitly 
with the “people of Cuba,” rather than Cuba as a state or with the 
Cuban government. This framing, along with his acknowledgement 
“U.S. policy towards Cuba had been 
marked by isolation and hostility, 
including repeated attempts to overthrow 
Cuba’s Communist government. Obama’s 
approach came as a drastic change in 
U.S. rhetoric and policy.”
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of the political, social, and historical perspectives of Cubans and 
Cuban Americans, highlights the centrality of empathy to his rheto-
ric surrounding the policy. Like U.S. negotiators did in private with 
their Cuban counterparts, Obama acknowledges the “complicated 
history” between the two countries and the ways in which U.S. ac-
tions have impacted Cubans, including the Bay of Pigs invasion 
and the “legacy of …colonization” (Obama, 2014a). In doing so, he 
exhibits an understanding that the U.S. government’s interventions 
have provoked anti-American sentiment and led to fear contribut-
ing to the hostility between the two countries. This recognition is 
important in mitigating the security dilemma and diplomatic stale-
mate the two nations faced (Wheeler, 2008, p. 496). 
Obama also demonstrates an understanding of how his words and 
his decision to pursue normalization of diplomatic relations would 
be perceived4  by the Cuban American community, most of whom 
were staunchly opposed to the Castro government. Coverage of 
this announcement, however, reveals that Obama’s attempts to see 
this from the side of Cuban Americans and Cuban advocates for 
regime change were unsuccessful in changing the minds of these 
individuals. Older Cuban dissidents felt that this was a betrayal by 
Obama and would not lead to concessions by the Castros, and all 
seven Cuban American legislators in Congress opposed it (Burnett 
& Neuman, 2014; Hook, 2014). It did seem to resonate, however, 
with a younger generation of Cuban-Americans, who were “open 
to change” (Baker, 2014).
President Raúl Castro, speaking on the change in policy the same day, 
acknowledged the “profound differences” between the two coun-
tries and his “willingness to dialogue on all these issues” (“Speech”, 
2014). His speech reiterated his belief in Communist rule, though 
the fact that he was willing to engage in dialogue about U.S. con-
cerns was a significant change from being unwilling to discuss these 
matters until the embargo was lifted (“Speech”, 2014; Bush, 2007). 
In later statements regarding the normalization of U.S.-Cuba rela-
tions, Obama uses similar rhetoric with empathetic connotations. 
When announcing on July 1, 2015, that the United States formally 
re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba and would reopen an 
embassy in the country, Obama frequently refers to Cubans as the 
United States’ “neighbors” and repeatedly talks about the physical 
proximity of the two countries, being “separated by only 90 miles” 
(Obama, 2015a; Obama & Castro, 2015; Obama & Castro, 2016a). 
This language attempts to evoke affective empathy for Cuba and 
Cubans by highlighting how close the two are to Americans, a mes-
sage of similarity that would make it easier for the general public 
to understand his decisions. At the same time, he demonstrates a re-
spect for Cuban ingenuity and sovereignty by talking about certain 
shared values and where citizens of both countries have worked 
together “in Haiti against Cholera, and in West Africa against Eb-
ola” (Obama & Castro, 2016a).5 This show of respect is a crucial 
shift from the Bush administration, in which Cubans were framed 
as helpless members of a “shattered society,” often spoken to in a 
patronizing manner (Bush, 2007). In remarks before a meeting with 
President Castro on April 11, 2015, Obama again repeats language 
acknowledging the differences and “mistrust” that had developed 
between the two countries, as well as the historical context of a 
4 Cited as a criterion of empathetic discourse in (Yorke, 2017, p. 146).
5 See (Obama & Castro, 2015) for further examples of this rhetoric.
policy that for 50 years “had not changed on the part of the United 
States” (Obama & Castro, 2015). Seeking to understand the per-
spectives that Castro and many Cubans would have concerning the 
U.S. and U.S. action is one mechanism through which President 
Obama exercises empathy. 
Even President Castro begins to use this rhetoric, speaking about 
the U.S. and Cuba as neighbors developing “a friendship between 
our two peoples” and having “respect for the ideas of the other,” 
while at a joint press conference with Obama (Obama & Castro, 
2016a). This press conference alone was a success for the Obama 
administration; Rhodes describes how the “Cuban journalists, all 
employees of state-run media, seemed astonished to see their own 
leader taking questions” (Rhodes, 2018, p. 355). 
Obama’s language around physical proximity and connection be-
tween Cubans and Americans resonated with the press, and cov-
erage of the events of 2015 reflected more positive, though still 
cautious, views of the opening with Cuba, with most vocal opposi-
tion coming from Republican members of Congress (Davis, 2015; 
Schwartz, et al., 2015). Insights from Cuban citizens tended toward 
skepticism, specifically about concessions Castro would make, but 
many were also hopeful.6 All of this indicates that empathetic rhet-
oric has an important role to play in international relations, specifi-
cally on the level of public opinion. 
Videos of President Obama’s remarks also reveal more about his 
attempts to express and cultivate empathy. Throughout his presiden-
cy, Obama spoke in a calm, slower manner that conveyed an air of 
thoughtfulness and genuine care about the matter at hand. This was 
no different for his speeches about Cuba. In the video of Obama’s 
initial statement on the policy changes in 2014, his focus on the 
Cuban people and the unity required for this effort is further illumi-
nated by his emphasis on “and” when he talks about creating “more 
opportunities for the American and Cuban people,” and how “in-
creased commerce is good for Americans and for Cubans” (Obama, 
2014b). Not only do his words convey empathy, but his engagement 
and emphasis while speaking makes this display quite genuine. 
Furthermore, Obama’s notation of differences between the U.S. 
and Cuba is not only an example of his understanding of contrast-
ing views, but also demonstrates that he is keenly aware of what 
empathy is and what it is not. As Yorke describes, “It should be 
emphasised that the act of empathising does not mean condoning 
acts of terror or atrocities” (Yorke, 2017, p. 152). While Obama is 
able to build trust between the U.S. and the Cuban government by 
exhibiting empathy, he successfully maintains American interests 
because he understands and states publicly that he does not need to 
agree with or support Castro in order to interact diplomatically. In 
previous administrations and in the eyes of many established for-
eign policy experts, talking with a country was equivalent to giving 
in to their demands. This notion that “seeing to understand differ-
ent sections of society and their political, historical, structural, and 
social-economic context” equates to feeling compassionate or sup-
portive towards an adversary is misguided, yet it was the justifica-
tion for the United States’ Cuba policy for decades (Yorke, 2017, p. 
146). Maintaining that attitude fostered anti-American sentiment in 
6 See (Burnett, 2015) and (“In Cuban Capital”, 2014) for further information.
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Cuba and only increased tensions between the two countries, rather 
than actually pushing Cuba towards democratic reforms; Obama 
provided a different, more hopeful path. 
The climax of the Cuban Thaw was President Obama’s trip to Cuba 
in March 2016, where on March 22 he spoke in Havana. The Cu-
ban government agreed to have “Obama’s speech be broadcast—
uncensored—to the Cuban people,” the likes of which had never 
before happened in Cuba (Rhodes, 2018, p. 354). A great deal of 
thought went into how to balance recognition of values and posi-
tions of all the parties involved—from Castro, to the Cuban peo-
ple, to American interests, and possibly most importantly, to Cuban 
American communities. Rhodes describes visiting such communi-
ties in Miami, Florida: “Cuban Americans wanted to hear [Obama] 
make the case for democracy, for openness, and to include them in 
whatever story he told about Cuba” (Rhodes, 2018, p. 353). This is 
reflected in the speech when Obama talks about shared culture and 
religion, the reconciliation of families after decades, and when he 
says, “In the United States, we have a clear monument to what the 
Cuban people can build: it’s called Miami” (Obama, 2016). When 
Rhodes describes the speech, he says, “Every Cuban would hear it 
a different way. I had tried to paint a picture of a future in which 
there was a place for everyone’s story” (Rhodes, 2018, pp. 358-
359). This was especially important in the context of the event; 
the fact that the audience was largely Cuban was reflected in the 
way Obama spoke directly to Cuban citizens more than he had in 
previous speeches. This was his most full-throated pitch for democ-
racy in Cuba, yet he also made clear that he understood that these 
proposals were “sensitive, especially coming from an American 
President.” He continues:
Before 1959, some Americans saw Cuba as something to ex-
ploit, ignored poverty, enabled corruption. And since 1959, 
we’ve been shadow-boxers in this battle of geopolitics and 
personalities. I know the history, but I refuse to be trapped by 
it… What changes come will depend upon the Cuban people. 
We will not impose our political or economic system on you  
(Obama, 2016)
This is notable not only because of Obama’s awareness of how 
his words might be perceived by the audience, but also because 
his position strays from the traditional model of American power 
and hegemony.
EVALUATING SUCCESS
Overall, media and rhetorical analysis demonstrated a shift towards 
a more positive view of normalization. A New York Times/CBS 
News poll conducted in March 2016 found that nearly 60 percent of 
Americans supported “normalizing relations with Cuba” (Sussman, 
2016). The poll showed 52 percent of Americans approved of the 
way Obama was “handling relations with Cuba,” which was “up 
from 44 percent in December 2014,” when he first announced the 
policy changes (Sussman, 2016). Obama’s success in shifting pub-
lic opinion in support of his policy was also evident in the estab-
lishment of the New Cuba PAC, a pro-normalization group started 
in May 2015. The Wall Street Journal reported that the group had 
raised more than $178,000 by July 2015, which was an indication 
of increasing “public support for closer ties between the two coun-
tries” (Schwartz, 2015b). 
Obama’s major goal to “normalize relations between [the] two 
countries” was achieved: diplomatic relations between the two 
countries were reestablished, and the respective embassies opened 
in the U.S. and Cuba (Obama, 2014a; Obama, 2015b). The admin-
istration also removed Cuba from the list of designated state spon-
sors of terrorism in May 2015 (Schwartz, 2015a). In his speech to 
the Cuban people, Obama outlined other steps he took to loosen 
restrictions, which included restoring “direct flights and mail ser-
vice,” expanding “commercial ties,” and increasing “the capacity 
of Americans to travel and do business in Cuba” (Obama, 2016). 
Additionally, on January 12, 2017, Obama announced an end to 
the “wet foot, dry foot” immigration policy that allowed Cubans 
who arrived on U.S. soil without visas to stay and gain legal resi-
dency. This policy was unique to Cuban migrants and described by 
national security archivist Peter Kornbluh as “‘a relic of the Cold 
War’” (Davis & Robles, 2017). These were all significant steps in 
improving relations between the two countries. 
Despite these changes, Obama’s call to Congress to lift the “em-
bargo that is a legacy of a failed policy” was unsuccessful (Obama, 
2015b). Shifting public opinion and outside support was not signif-
icant enough to get the Republican-controlled House and Senate 
to enact such legislation.7 As a result, President Trump was able 
to walk back many of the Obama administration’s changes. The 
Trump administration’s policy more closely resembles the policies 
that preceded Obama, though diplomatic relations remain relatively 
intact (“U.S.-Cuba Relations”, n.d.).
Furthermore, Obama’s goals of spurring democratic reforms and 
creating more open dialogue through reestablishing this relation-
ship were not realized. He repeatedly stated his belief that per-
son-to-person interactions and economic reforms would generate 
change in Cuba, explaining that Cuban Americans “are the best 
possible ambassadors for [U.S.] values,” and that the U.S. “can do 
more to support the Cuban people and promote our values through 
engagement” (Obama, 2014a). However, foreign policy scholars 
found that years later, this policy showed weak returns. Despite in-
creases in tourism and remittances, there was no expansion of inter-
net access or decrease in internet censorship, and, in 2016, Cuban 
authorities detained a record high number of individuals (Abrams, 
2018). Experts at the Council on Foreign Relations believe that the 
policies failed to generate improvements in human rights because 
“the Obama administration failed to demand any improvements 
from Cuba in exchange for the various diplomatic, trade, and trav-
el concessions it granted Havana” (Abrams, 2018). While Obama 
7 See (Baker, 2014) and (Davis, 2015) for further background on the role of 
Congress.
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did call upon the Castro regime to make changes, there may have 
been other opportunities to force more concessions in exchange for 
loosening restrictions. Based on his rhetoric, though, he believed 
that progress would come from the Cuban people as the U.S. lifted 
restrictions, and he wanted to respect Cuba’s sovereignty (Obama, 
2016). These failings speak to the limitations of rhetoric alone to 
create change. 
MOVING FORWARD
This analysis hits upon aforementioned challenges of analyzing 
emotions in foreign policy. It is difficult to extract empathy from 
the other emotions that Obama evokes in his speeches, such as hope 
and unity. In some cases, these can be seen as mechanisms that 
empathy is exercised through, but often they stand on their own 
as a different kind of emotional rhetoric. It is also challenging to 
directly correlate the public attitude changes to the rhetoric Obama 
used, yet because this approach was so different from what the pub-
lic had seen before, it is fair to attribute the shift in public relations 
and opening up of Cubans to the U.S. in part to Obama’s rhetoric 
and willingness to engage, much of which relied upon empathy. 
Additionally, the recency of these events makes it impossible to 
judge the long-term impact of Obama’s policy of empathy, and it 
also means that Obama’s personal notes are not widely available, 
making it infeasible to study empathy on the interpersonal level 
in great detail. Ben Rhodes’ accounts of private negotiations and 
speechwriting were crucial in contextualizing Obama’s thought 
process behind various speeches and remarks. However, it leaves 
unanswered questions about the significance of interpersonal em-
pathy during the negotiating process itself. 
Empathy cannot be hailed unequivocally as a mechanism for 
change; as Head describes, “whilst empathy in no way determines 
change, it opens up the possibilities for it” (Head, 2012, p. 47). 
The success that President Obama had in opening up dialogue be-
tween the U.S. and Cuba and reestablishing diplomatic relations 
speaks to the importance of considering empathy in foreign policy 
and, in Obama’s words, that perhaps it is not a reward to talk to 
folks, but the logical way to mitigate conflict. Constant signaling 
between Castro and Obama allowed for the recognition of the dif-
ferent parties that held a stake in the matter, and it demonstrated 
the importance of recognizing the historical wrongs one’s coun-
try committed. However, the current state of human rights in Cuba 
suggests that this policy was ineffectual in pushing for democratic 
reforms. The broad overview of the role of empathy in Obama’s 
philosophy and rhetoric during the Cuban Thaw, provided in this 
paper, is an important component in understanding how similar em-
pathetic ideologies function in foreign policy and the limits of their 
efficacy. These implications for practitioners of foreign policy and 
diplomacy will be better understood with more research and case 
study analysis of empathy in conflict transformation
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